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PATENT TROLLS, NUISANCE SUITS, AND THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION
By Matthew Spitzer1
The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) Patent Assertion
Entity Activity Report (“The Report”) includes a path-breaking
collection of data. The Report was compiled with the object of
changing policy, both in Congress and before the courts. Because
of the FTC’s ability to force businesses and individuals to provide
information, a power that no ordinary researcher possesses, the
FTC has amassed a data set that can potentially be of great value.
For example, the Report’s description of litigation Patent Assertion
Entities’ (“PAEs”) and portfolio PAEs’ structure and behavior is,
although not entirely new, very instructive. Unfortunately, the FTC
made analytical errors that preclude using its work to directly
support policy prescriptions. First, the FTC claims that if a suit
settles for less than $300,000, then the suit was likely Negative
Expected Value (“NEV”). In addition, the FTC claims that NEV
suits are bad. These claims are analytically false. Second, the FTC’s
policy recommendations have no connection to any of its factual
analysis. Although this does not prove that the policy
recommendations are bad ideas, the FTC’s factual analysis gives
the reader no help, at all, in deciding on the merits of the
1

Howard and Elizabeth Chapman Professor of Law and Director, Searle Center
on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, Pritzker Law School, Northwestern
University. I received very helpful comments from Andrew Daughety, Anne
Layne-Farrar, Alex Lee, Suzanne Munck, Jennifer Reinganum, David Schwartz,
Jean Spitzer, Greg Sidak, Kathy Spier, and all of the participants at the Searle
Center’s Public Policy Forum on the Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC
Study, October 13, 2016. The author grudgingly accepts responsibility for
remaining errors. The author received support from the Searle Center while
preparing this article. The Searle Center has been supported by a very large gift
from the late Dan Searle, as well as by major gifts from Qualcomm, Microsoft,
Intellectual Ventures, and Google. A list of the Searle Center’s donors can be
found
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http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/
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recommendations. Further, because the Report’s analytics are so
flawed, they cannot help one evaluate any proposed new policies.
Therefore, in terms of providing normative guidance, the Report is
a failure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), a powerful federal
administrative agency whose jurisdiction includes competition
policy and consumer protection, released in 2016 a Patent Assertion
Entity Activity Report (the “Report”) on the litigation activities of
Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”).2 In this report the FTC
denigrates the activities of PAEs, partly by calling them “patent
2

FTC, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entityactivity-ftc-study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_
an_ftc_study_0.pdf. Patent trolls are also sometimes called Patent Assertion
Entities (PAEs) or Non Practicing Entities (NPEs). In this article I will use the
terms patent troll and PAE interchangeably.
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trolls.” The denigration of PAEs in the Report supports harmful
policy initiatives that would change patent law in ways that are bad
for society.
Patents are property rights to certain technologies, limited in
time and scope, issued by the Federal government to inventors who
satisfy a set of prerequisites.3 Patents are explicitly authorized by the
United States Constitution,4 to “promote the [P]rogress of
[S]cience.” This phrase is understood today to encompass at least
two different ideas. The first is that limited monopoly will
incentivize inventors to invent—which will ultimately benefit
many.5 Second, the patent rights are extremely useful at
commercializing inventions and providing a foundation for
disclosing inventions to firms without worrying about theft of ideas.6
3

Patent law is codified in Title 35 of the United States Code. See 35 U.S.C. §§
101–103 (2006). Section 101 allows patents in a useful “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” that is “new and useful.” § 101. Section
102 explains what it means to be “new,” while § 103 requires that the invention
not be “obvious” to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See §§ 101–102.
4
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”).
5
See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609
(Richard R. Nelson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1962); Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Richard C.
Levin, Appropriability, R&D Spending, and Technological Performance, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 424 (1988). But see, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS
AT RISK (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); Michele Boldrin & David Levine, The
Case Against Intellectual Property, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 209 (2002); Michele
Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(2013).
6
See Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 1565, 1572 (2016) (“Without some form of regulatory intervention, an
inventor would be unable to appropriate enough of the benefits of her invention
to recoup the cost of making it, leading to the under-production of inventions
generally.”); see also Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of
the Market for Inventions, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271, 274 (2015)
(“Patents promote disclosure of inventions, which reduces costs of search and
bargaining in the market for inventions.”).
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Commercializing inventions is crucial for making consumers better
off; if the consumers cannot buy products utilizing new technology,7
they are not enriched.
For most of our country’s history, patents were usually asserted
by patent-holders who were producing goods and services with their
patented technology.8 However, within the past twenty years,9 the
emergence of a new type of firm has challenged, for some, the
positive arguments for patents. The new firms, known as either
patent trolls or PAEs, acquire patents with the intent only to assert
the patents against firms that manufacture and distribute goods.
Under either name they are controversial. PAEs do not use the
patents to manufacture or distribute their own goods. Hence, some
commentators maintain that PAEs do not contribute to economic
activity, but rather slow down the activity of other firms.10 Other
commentators have suggested changing patent laws to respond to
PAEs’ activities.11
The discomfort with patent trolls burst into the mainstream legal
consciousness in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange12 in 2006. eBay
concerned patents, owned by MercExchange, that covered eBay’s
“Buy It Now” element.13 eBay tried to license MercExchange’s
patents, but negotiations failed.14 Following trial, a jury awarded
7

This includes products that are produced using the new, inventive techniques.
David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Marketplace, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2013).
9
For example, Intellectual Ventures, arguably the largest Patent Assertion
Entity, was founded in 2000. Leadership, INTELL. VENTURES,
http://www.intellectualventures.com/about/leadership/nathan-myhrvold/
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2018).
10
See sources infra note 24-26.
11
Id.
12
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also Robert P.
Merges, Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange,
21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997 (2006); Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or MarketMakers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
114 (2010); Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and
Why: An Analysis of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV.
677 (2015) (revisiting the impact of the eBay decision)
13
eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
14
Id.
8
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damages of $30,000,000 to MercExchange.15 MercExchange moved
for permanent injunctive relief, but was denied by the District Court
Judge.16 This denial of the request for an injunction ultimately made
its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. In a unanimous
decision the Court announced that patent-holders would no longer
be routinely entitled to injunctive relief. Instead, trial courts were to
apply a four-part test when a patent-holder requested an injunction.17
What was the reason for this massive change in the law? A fourJustice concurrence by Justice Kennedy spelled it out:
In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic
function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier
cases. An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a
basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed
as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to
buy licenses to practice the patent. When the patented invention is but a
small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the
threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.18

Justice Kennedy’s explanation implicitly contained a basic
concern about PAEs: they would cause economic damage by
asserting patents over small components of much larger products.
The full theory was also spelled out in 2006, in likely the bestknown and most widely cited law review article on the topic, Patent
15

Id. at 391.
Id.
17
Id. (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.”).
18
Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Kirti
Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent
Cases (Univ. Ill. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-03),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629399 (describing the
impact of the eBay decision on injunctive relief in patent cases).
16
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Holdup and Royalty Stacking, by Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro.19
The problem, explained by Lemley and Shapiro, stems from two
issues.
One is Holdup. If the courts grant injunctions to those firms that
hold patents on small components of larger products after the larger
product has been designed and produced – a situation called patent
holdup, the patent-holder will be able to shut down manufacture and
sale of the larger product completely.20 To escape the force of the
injunction, the firms making the product (“producer”) must get the
assent of the patent-holder. There have been two traditional ways of
doing this. First, if the patent-holder is also a producer of a product,
the second firm (which is also a producer) can threaten to sue the
patent-holder for infringement of patents that the second firm holds.
The two firms then settle by cross-licensing. Second, the producing
firm can offer to pay the patent-holder money, in theory up to the
full value of the product. However, if the patent-holder does not
produce (and, hence, is a troll or a Patent Assertion Entity), then no
cross-licensing is possible. The only thing the producing firm can
do is pay, and pay dearly. However, a rational firm, anticipating such
19

See Articles, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl
=en&as_sdt=0%2C14&q=lemley+and+shapiro&oq=Lemley+and (last visited
Sept. 1, 2018) (showing that Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2006) has been cited over 1200 times);
see also Ted Sichelman, Most Cited IP Law Articles over the Last 10 years,
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 24, 2014), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com
/2016/03/most-cited-ip-law-articles-published-in.html. Professor Sichelman
reports that the Lemley and Shapiro article was the second-most cited article in
all of Intellectual Property Law from 2004-2008. See id. That category includes
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright. See id. Mark Lemley is likely the most
influential scholar in the field. See id. He authored or coauthored the number 1,
2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, and 14 most cited articles in Professor Sichelman’s list of 25.
See id.
20
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Treating RAND Commitments Neutrally, 11 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 2–3 (2015); Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting,
Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 603–04 (2007) (“In very broad
terms, opportunism or hold-up arises when a gap between economic commitments
and subsequent commercial negotiations enables one party to capture part of the
fruits of another’s investment, broadly construed.”); Schwartz & Kesan, supra
note 8, at 429.
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hold-up behavior, may decide not to produce in the first place. Then
we are all worse off because we have no product to consume.21
The other is Royalty Stacking. If there are many different patentholders that have patents that read on a product, the injunction
problem will be made much worse. Many injunctions will be very
hard to navigate. But even if the court awards only damages to the
patent-holders, the sum of the royalty payments may exceed the
value of the product. If the patent-holders do not produce anything,
cross-licensing is ruled out as a solution. Each patent-holder will
have the incentive to ask for the largest award it can get, regardless
of the effect on the size of the total royalty bill to the producer.
Again, a producer, anticipating this situation, may choose not to
produce in the first place; we are all worse off.22 This narrative is
reflected in many papers by Lemley and Shapiro23 and in others.24
21

Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2006).
22
Id. (“Such royalty overcharges act as a tax on new products incorporating the
patented technology, thereby impeding rather than promoting innovation.”).
23
See generally, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the
ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012); Farrell et al., supra
note 20; Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 AM.
ECON. REV. 1347 (2008) (studying the value of determining patent validity prior
to licensing patents to “downstream technology users”); Mark A. Lemley,
Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008); Mark A. Lemley, Are
Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611
(2008) (arguing that universities should prioritize the social impact of their
technology over licensing revenue); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About
Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007)
(proposing solutions to the patent holdup problem); Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for StandardEssential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013) (advocating a standard
set of rules governing commitments between patent owners and implementers of
standards to determine royalty rates); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005) (noting, in part, that patent
litigation settlements often have the negative side effect of limiting competition);
Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 280 (2010) (indicating that injunctions affect royalties negotiated between
patent holders and technology users).
24
See generally, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs
from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014) (estimating the size and
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There are, of course, counter-narratives. For one, PAEs provide
a middleman market for small inventors who otherwise would be
unable to earn any money from inventive activity.25 A small inventor
cannot credibly threaten to sue a major industrial firm, and therefore
cannot get a licensing deal. Instead, the small inventor can sell the
patent to a PAE who can sue the major industrial firm, garnering
some money. A second counter-narrative is that the arguments about
patent holdup and royalty stacking prove far too much. They should
apply with the most force to complex products with up to tens of
thousands of patents that read on them. The force of these arguments
should greatly slow or even stop innovation on smart phones,
tablets, portable computers, automobiles, and so forth. And yet it is
precisely in these areas that both casual empiricism and recent more
formal analysis26 suggests that the rate of innovation is extremely
impact of NPE patent assertions); George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust
Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J.
913 (2011); Bernhard Ganglmair et al., Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a
Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation, 60 J. INDUS. ECON. 249 (2012);
Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Preventing Patent Hold Up: An Economic Assessment
of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445 (2009);
Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 729–35
(2005); see also Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 8 (disputing Bessen and Meurer’s
methodology).
25
Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137 (2015) (outlining the argument and then
presenting survey evidence purporting to cast doubt on the argument).
26
See J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of
Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92
MINN. L. REV. 714 (2008), for the immediate, direct response to Lemley and
Shapiro’s Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, supra note 21. See also, e.g.,
Alexander Galetovic & Kirti Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential
Patents: Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry 2–3 (Feb.
2017), SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2790347;
Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray? 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 1313 (2017); Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking
Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties? 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535
(2008); Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup
Theory, 13 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1 (2017); Douglas H. Ginsburg et al.,
“Excessive Royalty” Prohibitions and the Dangers of Punishing Vigorous
Competition and Harming Incentives to Innovate, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON.
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high and that consumers benefit greatly. A third counter-narrative is
that “troll” or “PAE” is a far too broad category to be useful for
policy arguments. Undoubtedly the best work in this vein is by
Christopher Cotropia, Jay Kesan, and David Schwartz.27 They show
that these big terms include a wide range of litigators, including
those who invent and patent new technologies, such as industrial
laboratories, small inventors, and universities, former practicing
entities who can make money by asserting their patents despite
product failures in the marketplace, those who purchase patents for
the purpose of asserting them, and others. For most people,
intuitions vary widely as to the social value of each type of patent
asserting entity. None of these counter-narratives has calmed the
concerns with PAEs.
The America Invents Act (“AIA”) of 201128 was seen, in no
small part, as a response to PAEs. Some commentators have claimed
that PAEs tend to own weak patents.29 In response, the AIA made it

(2016); J. Gregory Sidak, Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate
Patent Holdup?, 1 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 601 (2016); Kirti Gupta et al., IP
Leadership Brussels: Highlights and Economic Analysis, COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L,
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/11/CPI-Gupta-Wong-Ervin-Coniglio-Naegele.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2018); Devlin Hartline & Matthew Barblan, Debunking the Royalty Stacking
Theory: Real-World Evidence From the Mobile Wireless Industry, CTR. FOR THE
PROT. OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. (Jan. 2016), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/31/2016/01/Hartline-Barblan-Debunking-the-RoyaltyStacking-Theory.pdf.
27
See Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014). Some of this was
anticipated, but without the empirical rigor of Cotropia, Kesan and Schwartz. See
also Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013).
28
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
29
See generally John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme
Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009); Jay Pil Choi, Live and Let Live: A Tale of Weak Patents,
3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 724 (2005); David Encaoua & Yassine Lefouili, Licensing
“Weak” Patents, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 492 (2009); Anne Layne-Farrar & Klaus M.
Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls,” Market Structure,
and “Excessive” Royalties, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1121 (2010).
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easier for those who opposed a patent to challenge its validity before
the US Patent and Trademark Office.30
The concern with trolls/PAEs did not stop with the passage of
the AIA. In February of 2013 President Obama condemned trolls in
a speech.31 In response, in June of 2013, the FTC decided to
investigate PAE activity.32 The FTC is a powerful administrative
agency whose jurisdiction includes promoting competition and
consumer protection.33 The agency has authority to issue trade
regulation rules, to review mergers, and to gather data and issue
reports.34 The FTC’s data-gathering power is quite substantial:
Another investigative tool, this one available in both competition and
consumer protection matters, appears in Section 6 of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. Sec. 46. Section 6(b) empowers the Commission to require the
filing of “annual or special . . . reports or answers in writing to specific
questions” for the purpose of obtaining information about “the
organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to
other corporations, partnerships, and individuals” of the entities to whom
the inquiry is addressed. . . .
The Commission’s 6(b) authority enables it to conduct wide-ranging
economic studies that do not have a specific law enforcement
purpose. . . . Section 6(b) enables the Commission to obtain answers to
specific questions as part of an antitrust law enforcement investigation,
where such information would not be available through subpoena
because there is no document that contains the desired answers. Section
6 also authorizes the Commission to “make public from time to time”
30

See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2017). The new process, called Inter Partes Review,
allows a petitioner to challenge the validity of a patent under § 102 (novelty) or
§ 103 (obviousness).
31
Diane Bartz, Obama Says Patent Reform Needs to Go Farther, REUTERS
(Feb. 14, 2013, 8:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obamapatent/obama-says-patent-reform-needs-to-go-fartheridUSBRE91E03320130215.
32
Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Is Said to Plan Inquiry of Frivolous Patent Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/business/ftcis-said-to-plan-inquiry-of-frivolous-patent-lawsuits.html. Note that the order of
President Obama’s condemnation and the FTC’s data gathering is, from a logical
point of view, completely backwards.
33
See What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/whatwe-do (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). Investigating PAE litigation activity probably
fits best with the competition side of the agency.
34
Authority stemming from 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2017), known as “section 6.”
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portions of the information that it obtains, where disclosure would serve
the public interest (15 U.S.C. Sec. 46(f)).35

The FTC gathered information and then issued the Report that
this article critiques. The Report collected data on PAEs, organized
it, reported on the data, and suggested four public policy changes.36
This article will show that the FTC made critical analytical errors
that greatly limit the Report’s usefulness. But before we get to the
sections explaining the errors we must spend a few pages reviewing
the Report’s intended purposes.
The FTC’s data, collected under the authority of Section 6(b) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act,37 revealed some fascinating
insights.38 First, the FTC’s data revealed two different types of
PAEs: in the words of the FTC, “portfolio” PAEs and “litigation”
PAEs. Their behaviors are very different. Portfolio PAEs tend to
send demand letters to manufacturers (rather than suing first), to
offer licenses to large portfolios of patents, to enter into licenses
without ever suing the manufacturer, and to obtain licenses that
typically run in the millions of dollars.39 More than 80% of the
reported revenue from patent licenses flow to portfolio PAEs, rather
than to litigation PAEs. But the portfolio PAEs file a small minority
of the lawsuits found in the FTC’s study. In contrast to portfolio
PAEs, litigation PAEs tend to file suit before contacting the target
manufacturers, tend to own and license fewer than 10 patents, and
tend to settle their lawsuits relatively quickly and for relatively small
amounts of money.40

35

A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 46).
36
See FTC, supra note 2, at 1-13.
37
15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2017).
38
This description is a summary of the FTC’s description. The underlying data
has not been made available to researchers. My conversation with Suzanne
Munck, Deputy Director and Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property at the
Federal Trade Commission, strongly suggests that the FTC has no plans to release
the data in any form.
39
FTC, supra note 2, at 3.
40
Id. at 92.
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The portfolio PAEs and litigation PAEs operate in different
structural fashion. The portfolio PAEs raise money from investors,
often including investment funds and manufacturing firms. They
then use the money to buy large numbers of patents and assemble
them into one or more large portfolios. The portfolio PAEs assert
the large portfolio(s) against a target manufacturer, obtain a large
license fee, and pass part of the license fee back to the investors in
the particular portfolio(s) that were asserted. Litigation PAEs, in
contrast, are thinly capitalized and have between one and three
individual owners. The litigation PAEs acquire a (small) portfolio
of patents, assign the portfolio to an “affiliate”, usually set up as an
LLC, and the affiliate asserts through litigation the portfolio against
a target manufacturer and usually obtains a relatively small amount
of money for a license. Litigation PAEs tend to use “revenue
sharing.”41 Thus, sellers of the patents keep a financial interest in the
revenues derived from asserting the patents that they sell to the PAE,
and sometimes the seller has to assist with the litigation.42 Attorneys
representing the litigation PAEs usually work on a contingency fee
arrangement.
The amount of the license fees that flowed to litigation PAEs
came in for special attention from the FTC. “77% of reported
Litigation PAE licenses were for less than $300,000.”43 Because the
FTC believed that $300,000 represents the lower bound on the costs
of litigating a patent, small settlements indicated that many or most
of the litigation PAEs’ suits were “nuisance” suits.44 Nuisance suits,
as used in the FTC’s PAE Report, are those that cost more to litigate
than the expected recovery after trial. And such suits, according to
the FTC, are bad. “Nuisance infringement litigation . . . can tax
judicial resources and divert attention away from productive
business behavior.”45
We will have much to say in the pages that follow about
nuisance suits and the FTC’s jumping to conclusions about whether
41

Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 4.
45
Id. at 9.
42
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these patent lawsuits have social value. But before we get there, we
must point out that the FTC made four policy proposals, ostensibly
grounded in their observation about nuisance suits. The four
proposed reforms are:
1. Develop rules and case management practices to address discovery
burden and cost asymmetries in PAE litigation.”46 The FTC noted that
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to meet
and work on producing a plan for discovery. The FTC suggested that
Rule 26 should be amended, inter alia, to require early disclosure of
asserted claims and infringement and invalidity contentions, as well as
to limit discovery before preliminary motions together with provisions
to ensure that such motions are decided quickly.
2. Amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 to reach a broader range
of non-party interested entities or persons.”47 This is to help judges know
and understand when they have a financial interest in one of the parties
to a lawsuit.
3. Establish procedures encouraging courts to stay a PAE’s infringement
action against a customer or end-user, where the PAE has also sued the
manufacturer of the accused product under the same theory of
infringement.”48 The FTC reasoned that a manufacturer has much better
information than retailers or end users do, and hence it would make
sense, from a judicial economy perspective, to stay all suits other than
the one(s) against the manufacturer(s).
4. As courts continue to address the ‘plausibility’ of pleadings in patent
cases, ensure that patent infringement complaints provide sufficient
notice to accused infringers.”49 Because an amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure from 2015 essentially required greater
specificity in patent infringement litigation, the FTC is, in essence,
exhorting the Federal Courts to pay attention to the new rule.50

This critique of the Report demonstrates that the Report may be
fundamentally misleading and induce counterproductive policy
responses in at least two different ways.51 First, the FTC’s analysis
46

Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
48
Id. at 12.
49
Id.
50
28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012).
51
We will not address the numerous methodological issues with the FTC’s PAE
Activity Report. Those issues have been ably covered by others. See Kristen J.
Osenga, Sticks and Stones: How the FTC’s Name-Calling Misses the Complexity
of Licensing-Based Business Models, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001 (2015); Anne
47
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of the litigation data is potentially defective. Second, the policy
recommendations neither flow directly from the data (even if the
analysis were to have been done better), nor are they necessarily as
innocuous as they seem at first glance.
Before we jump headlong into an analysis of the litigation data
and its import, we must consider why we are doing so. Although
there are no new patent reform bills that have any chance of passing
at this time, it is crucial to understand the FTC’s Report’s failure
now; when the federal government calms down and gets back to
business, because of either elections or another reason, bills that can
pass will be introduced, and the Report will undoubtedly be cited to
support some of these bills. In addition, a court may utilize the
Report to help decide a case or to reform doctrine. For these reasons,
we must analyze and understand the Report.
II. LITIGATION DATA
To understand the FTC’s litigation data, we must first focus on
the difference between nuisance suits and meritless suits.52 Meritless
suits are those that, if taken to trial, would almost certainly lose. The
judge or jury would rule against the plaintiff and the suit would fail.
On the other hand, a nuisance suit, as used by a few analysts and the
Report, is one which is not worth bringing once one includes
plaintiff’s litigation costs.53 In some of the academic literature,
Layne-Farrar, What Can the FTC’s Section 6(B) PAE Study Teach Us? A
Practical Review of the Study’s Methodology, Results, and Policy
Recommendations, 13 J. COMPETITION. L. & ECON. 1 (2017).
52
The discussion in this section follows the excellent explanation in Kathryn E.
Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS § 4 (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
53
This distinction, but with “frivolous” replacing “meritless,” is exactly the
same as used by William Hubbard in his recent paper. See Sinking Costs to Force
or Deter Settlement, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 545 (2016). “[A] ‘nuisance suit’ is
a suit filed because it has positive settlement value, notwithstanding the fact
that it is common knowledge to the plaintiff and the defendant that the expected
value plaintiff’s claim is less than the plaintiff’s cost of prosecuting the suit.” Id.
at 545 (emphasis in original). “‘Frivolous litigation’ in common usage and
in the sense that . . . [we] will use the term herein, is a species of nuisance
litigation. In a frivolous suit, the expected value of plaintiff’s claim is less than
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“nuisance” suits are called, more accurately, “negative expected
value” suits.54 That is because nuisance is pejorative, and can easily
be mistaken for “meritless.” However, the Report routinely uses the
word “nuisance.” For example, the Report states, “Given the
relatively low dollar amounts of the licenses, the behavior of
Litigation PAEs is consistent with nuisance litigation.”55
The Report, in my opinion, has several fundamental problems
when it describes the litigation data.
First, the Report consistently utilizes the phrase “nuisance suit,”
rather than the more neutral Negative Expected Value (“NEV”) suit.
This pejorative can mislead the reader into thinking that NEV suits
are meritless. But this is not true. The category of NEV suits
includes both meritless suits and meritorious suits. Whereas the
former may be worthy of disapprobation, the latter have value,
particularly in contexts like patent, where enforcing rights is
supposed to guide conduct and produces spillover benefits.
Second, the Report incorrectly claims that a low settlement
amount implies that the suit was a NEV suit. This is wrong. A low
plaintiff’s cost of litigating because the claim is extremely low merit—the
likelihood of prevailing at summary judgment (let alone trial) is so low that
the expected value of the claim is near zero.” Id. Similarly, Lucian Bebchuk
and Alon Klement state:
It should be emphasized that an NEV [Negative Expected
Value] suit need not be a frivolous suit—that is, a suit in
which the plaintiff is unlikely to win. The expected judgment
is a product of the likelihood of a plaintiff’s victory and the
amount at stake. Therefore, a meritorious suit—one in which
the likelihood of a plaintiff victory is quite high—might be
NEV if the litigation costs involved are sufficiently large
relative to the amount at stake.
Lucian Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative Expected-Value Suits 53 (Harv.
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 656, 2009).
54
See Layne-Farrar, supra note 24; see also Robert G. Bone, Modeling
Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997) (discussing at length the definition
of “meritless suits”). Defendants undoubtedly regard all suits as a “nuisance.” No
one likes to be sued. But if the plaintiff is likely to win at trial, using the term
“nuisance” is likely to misleadingly convey the impression that the suit is
meritless or, equivalently, “frivolous.”
55
FTC, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasis added).
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settlement amount is completely consistent with both Positive
Expected Value (“PEV”) suits and NEV suits.
Third, putting the first two points together, there is absolutely no
link between low settlement amounts and “bad” lawsuits.
A. Nuisance Suits v. Meritless Suits
The FTC repeatedly calls NEV suits “nuisance” suits, and does
so in a way that demeans them. For example, consider the statement
at page ten of the Report:
The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), which
periodically surveys the costs of patent litigation, recently reported that
defending an NPE patent lawsuit through the end of discovery costs
between $300,000 and $2.5 million, depending on the amount in
controversy. By this estimate, 77% of Litigation PAEs’ settlements fell
below a de facto benchmark for the nuisance cost of litigation. This
suggests that discovery costs, and not the technological value of the
patent, may set the benchmark for settlement value in Litigation PAE
cases.56

What does the FTC mean by stating that it may not be “the
technological value of the patent” that is helping to set the settlement
value for cases that settle for less than the lower end of discovery
costs, $300,000? On its face, the FTC’s statement is almost always
right. The technological value of the patent is reasonably interpreted
to mean how useful the patented technology is in implementing an
invention. But there is no reason that the technological value, by
itself, ought to play a role in settlement value. Instead, it is the
economic value of the patent that should play a role in determining
settlement amount, which is likely what the FTC meant. Therefore,
we will interpret the FTC to be claiming that if the settlement
amount is less than $300,000, then the underlying economic value
of the patent may have played no role in settlement amount. And, it
is reasonable to infer that the FTC is claiming that such patents often
have an economic value far less than $300,000.57
56

Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The patents that are settled for less than $300,000 might have low value (if,
in fact, they do) either because they have little chance of being upheld in a court
challenge, or because the patent claim is likely valid, but for very low damages.
Either way, the assertion is that the patent is of very little value. For purposes of
discussion below, we will discuss both possibilities.
57
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The FTC reinforces the point about “nuisance” suits by
producing the following chart at page 89 of the Report, entitled
“Frequency Distribution of Patent Licensing Royalties.” The FTC’s
ensuing discussion repeatedly refers to nuisance value. Thus, on
page 91, the Report states:
the revenues received in patent licenses, particularly those
for relatively small amounts, may have been influenced
heavily by the parties’ desire to avoid the cost of litigation.
To evaluate the possibility that PAE licenses may reflect
nuisance-value settlements, the FTC compared license
royalties to the estimated cost of patent litigation.58

Figure 1: FTC’s figure showing distribution of settlement amounts

58

FTC, supra note 2, at 89 (footnote omitted).
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And, after a discussion of the distribution of settlements in the
chart above, the FTC concludes “By these estimates, 77% of
Litigation PAE settlements were valued below an approximate
benchmark representing the nuisance value of litigation, while 78%
of Portfolio PAE licenses were equal to or greater than the nuisance
value of litigation benchmark.”59
The FTC’s demeaning NEV suits by calling them “nuisance”
suits is wrong. Those NEV suits that are meritorious should not be
disparaged by the FTC. Meritorious suits may have social value by
guiding the conduct of third parties. Thus, patent law has a role to
play similar to the role of traditional common law—tort suits may
deter costly torts;60 contract law can encourage valuable
exchanges;61 and real property law can encourage people to build
houses and improve land.62 Patent law can help encourage people to
invest in future inventions, and to commercialize inventions once
they are made.63 Meritorious patent suits, including those that cost
so much that pursuing them is noneconomic for the plaintiff (and,
hence, “nuisance” suits in the FTC’s lexicon), can play a valuable
role in setting incentives for third parties. For this reason, those suits
should not be disparaged by calling them nuisance suits. Of course,
the term “nuisance suits” also includes meritless suits, and these
suits should, in general, be discouraged. But figuring out how to deal
with a category that includes valuable suits and valueless suits
requires far more nuanced analysis than that appearing in the FTC’s
59

Id. at 92.
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (Yale Univ. Press 1970).
61
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2011); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541(2003).
62
The analogy to property law can be very instructive. The FTC’s reasoning
would imply that suing to eject trespassers from cheap tract homes is less
defensible than suing to eject the same trespassers from a very expensive home.
The suit to recover possession of the tract home is, after all, much more likely to
be NEV. This reasoning cannot be right.
63
See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV., PAPERS & PROC. 347, 355 (1967). See generally F. Scott Kieff,
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 697 (2001); Spulber, supra note 6; Yelderman, supra note 6.
60
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Report, and will likely produce policy recommendations that differ
greatly from those in the Report.
B. Low Settlement Amount and the Quality of the Lawsuit
The FTC makes a second error when describing the litigation
data; the Report incorrectly asserts that a low settlement amount
implies that the underlying lawsuit was NEV—a “nuisance suit” in
the FTC’s terminology. This assertion is wrong, and almost
certainly represents a major problem with the FTC’s argument
structure. There is, in reality, no analytical connection between a
lawsuit settling for a small amount of money and the underlying
nature of the claim. More precisely, the settlement amount tells us
virtually nothing about whether or not the underlying suit was PEV,
NEV, or even whether or not it was likely meritorious. Of course,
the data represented in the chart above may be intrinsically
interesting. But the FTC is (like the rest of us) interested in policy
implications. Since the FTC has premised its policy
recommendations on the incorrect claim that most litigation PAEs’
lawsuits are “nuisance suits,” the policy recommendations are not
supported by the Report’s facts and analysis.
To establish my central analytical point—the lack of connection
between settlement amount and the nature of the underlying
lawsuits—we will proceed through a series of different types of
models of lawsuits. Some of them are explained through examples.
None of the models demonstrate any connection between settlement
amount and the nature of the underlying lawsuit. NEV lawsuits can
settle for large amounts of money, and PEV lawsuits can settle for
small amounts of money.
1. Example 1—Symmetric Information and Positive Expected
Value
In this example we assume that one patent owner (plaintiff) sues
one manufacturer (defendant). The plaintiff and defendant agree that
if the case were to be taken all the way through trial the plaintiff
would certainly prevail, and would be awarded $500,000. They also
both agree that to push the case all the way to verdict will cost the
plaintiff $480,000 and will cost defendant $400,000. With all these
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facts in mind, and before litigation takes place, the parties will
approach the issue of settlement.
Defendant makes final offer: Assume that the litigants agree that
defendant will make the final offer. Note that this does not have to
be the first offer, only the last one. It turns out that all the power lies
with the person who makes the last offer.64 Why would the defendant
make the last offer? Likely because defendant has established a
reputation for making an offer and never deviating from it. But it
could also be that the defendant has found another commitment
device not to waiver after his offer. How much will the defendant
offer? Will the plaintiff accept? The defendant will first calculate
the plaintiff’s net gain from going through trial. That is $500,000 $480,000 = $20,000.65 Thus, to induce the plaintiff to accept the
defendant must offer a bit more. In the limit, the offer is $20,001.
The plaintiff will accept because $20,001 is more than $20,000. We
will observe a settlement for only $20,001, even though the
underlying lawsuit is completely meritorious and has PEV (in other
words, not a nuisance.)
Plaintiff makes final offer: Assume, in contrast to Example 1.a.,
that the plaintiff will make the final offer. This may be
counterintuitive. However, some lawyers work very hard at
establishing a “thug” type of reputation. Consider Erich
Spangenberg:
If you’re a corporate executive, this may be one of the last sentences you
want to hear: “Erich Spangenberg is on the line.” Invariably, Mr.
Spangenberg, the 53-year-old owner of IPNav, is calling to discuss a
patent held by one of his clients, which he says your company is
infringing — and what are you going to do about it?

64

Having the right to make the final offer of settlement is a reflection of
bargaining power. In this example the defendant has all of the bargaining power.
Even in a multiperiod model with alternating offers, making the final offer gives
that party all of the surplus from settlement. Spier, supra note 52, at 11-12.
65
We are assuming no chance of the court awarding plaintiff attorney’s fees.
The recent case of Highmark v. Allcare Health Management System appears to
have made it marginally easier for victorious plaintiffs to be awarded attorney’s
fees. See Highmark v. Allcare Health Management System, 134 S.Ct. 1744, 1749
(2014).
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Mr. Spangenberg is likely to open the conversation on a diplomatic note,
but if you put up enough resistance, or try to shrug him off, he can also,
as he put it, ‘go thug.’
He demonstrated what that sounds like in a brief bit of role-play recently,
sitting in the apartment he is renting for the summer in Paris near the Arc
de Triomphe. His voice dropped, the curse words flowed, and he spoke
with carefully modulated menace.66

IPNav, Spangenberg’s company, routinely sues when his offer
to settle is refused. Between 2008 and 2013, IPNav sued 1,638
companies.67 This is the sort of situation that case 1.b. models.
What is the highest offer the plaintiff can make that will be
accepted? If the case goes to trial the defendant will lose the
$500,000 damages, plus the $400,000 in costs. This sums to
$900,000. The plaintiff has to offer something a bit less than
$900,000 to induce the defendant to accept the offer. In the limit, the
offer is $899,999. The defendant will accept because $899,999 is
less than $900,000. Thus, we will observe a much higher settlement
amount, even though nothing has changed about the underlying
lawsuit.
Either plaintiff or defendant might make final offer: Assume that
neither party is certain which of them has the resolve to commit to
giving the final offer. The parties agree, however, that the defendant
will make the final offer with probability p, and the plaintiff will
make the final offer with probability with (1-p), where 0≤p≤1.68 In
this case, the parties will settle for about p($20,001) + (1p)($899,999). When p=1, we get Example 1.a.; when p=0, we get
the settlement in Example 1.b.; and when p is in between, we get a
settlement between those values. For any value of p>.68, the
66

David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N. Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2013, at BU1; see also Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino, A
Reputation for Being a Nuisance: Frivolous Lawsuits and Fee Shifting in a
Repeated Play Game, 18 INT’l REV. L. & ECON. 147 (1998) (providing additional
economic theory).
67
Segal, supra note 66.
68
Thus, p represents the defendant’s bargaining power, and 1-p represents the
plaintiff’s bargaining power. For an excellent discussion of bargaining power in
the context of determining a reasonable royalty, see J. Gregory Sidak, Bargaining
Power and Patent Damages, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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settlement will be less than $300,000, the FTC’s value for
concluding that a suit has NPV,69 and is therefore a “nuisance.”
Implications: What are the lessons to be learned? First, the FTC
is wrong. Observing a suit settle for less than $300,000, possibly
much less than $300,000, does not let us deduce that the suit is NPV.
Of course, we cannot deduce that the suit is meritless. In the example
above the suit had both merits and PEV. Second, it is bargaining
power, represented in the examples by the likelihood of giving the
final offer, which greatly determines the size of the settlement.
That is the theory. Is it borne out in practice? After all, as the old
saying goes, the difference between theory and practice is much
larger in practice than in theory. The answer is that it is very hard to
confirm or disconfirm this bargaining theory in naturally-occurring
environments. We have no way to observe, directly and in the field,
the parties’ beliefs about the likelihood of the plaintiff’s prevailing
and the expected size of damages. To test the theory, social scientists
have resorted to bargaining games in laboratory experiments.
The experiments that are the most germane are probably those
called “ultimatum” experiments. In an ultimatum game there are two
subjects. Their task is to divide some money, say $10. One of them
is chosen to make a first-and-final offer, while the other subject has
the right to accept or reject the offer. Thus, the first subject might
offer $3 to the second subject (and implicitly keep $7 for himself).
The second subject can either accept with one outcome ($7, $3), or
reject with another outcome (0, 0). If the ultimatum game is truly a
single-shot interaction, game theory predicts that the first subject
will offer only $1 (assuming one dollar minimum increments), and
the second subject will accept because $1 is more than $0. This game
gives all the bargaining power to the first subject.
However, when experimental economists first started running
these experiments they found that offers were much greater than the
theory suggested.70 The experiments show that those who have
69

FTC, supra note 2, at 92.
See Robert Forsythe, J. L. Horowitz, NE Savin & M. Sefton, Fairness in
Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 347, 349-51 (1994)
(experiments run and sources); see also Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L Spitzer,
70
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bargaining power get more of the surplus from making a deal,
depending on the circumstances. Thus, while dividing $10, the
offerors in ultimatum experiments frequently offered $5 or $4.
Many researchers originally thought that these offers represented a
taste for fairness, and even developed utility functions that
attempted to model the subject’s tastes. However, in an extremely
careful series of articles, Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Keith
Shachat, and Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith (“Hoffman, et al.”)
demonstrated the majority71 of the deviation from the game theoretic
ideal stemmed from other sources.72 First, the students worried that

The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982). Early
bargaining experiments showed that in face-to-face negotiations, where the
parties and their choices were observed by the experimenters, experimental
subjects were much more altruistic than theory predicts. It appears that subjects
are worried about getting a reputation for being selfish. Thus, the subjects are
playing a very different game than the one represented in the bargaining game
they are nominally playing. If, on the other hand, the experimenters take care to
ensure that the subject’s choices can be observed by neither the experimenter nor
the other subjects, the subjects pay much closer attention to the experimental
bargaining game they are playing, and often make choices so as to maximize their
own payoffs.
71
Fairness concerns, in some guise or other, do seem to play a role, as well. See
Güth & Kocher, infra note 72.
72
See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Preferences and Property Rights in
Ultimatum Games and Dictator Games, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS RESULTS 417-22 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., North
Holland 2008); Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Reciprocity in Ultimatum and Dictator
Games: An Introduction, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
RESULTS 417-22 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008); Elizabeth
Hoffman et al., Prompting Strategic Reasoning Increases Other-Regarding
Behavior, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 423-28;
Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Reciprocity in Dictator Games, in
supra, at 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 429-35; (Charles
R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008); Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Preferences,
Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 346 (1994); Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance and OtherRegarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653 (1996). For an
excellent review of ultimatum games, stressing the complex interaction between
fairness concerns and individually rational behavior, see Werner Güth & Martin
G. Kocher, More Than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments:
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they might be facing an opponent who would “punish” unfairness
by rejecting the offer. If you think your counterpart might “punish”
unfairness, the optimal strategy is to offer an amount considered
“fair,” and to maximize your expected value, which is the offer
amount times the chance you will not be rejected. Second, students
might also worry about their reputations among their fellow students
and with the researcher. The student subjects did not want to look
greedy. After all, their fellow students would likely be sources of
jobs, club memberships, and maybe a spouse or two in the years
ahead. The researchers, on the other hand, could provide access to
more experiments, and also possibly letters of reference. All of this
might be put at risk if a subject appeared too greedy. Third, the
subjects needed to be induced to believe that the right to make the
ultimatum offer was truly their right. Previous experiments used
language that put the issue very much in doubt, suggesting that the
right might be more communally owned.
To deal with the rights issue, Hoffman, et al., distributed the
right to make the ultimatum offer either by making the subjects
compete in a contest, with the winner getting the right to make the
offer, or by auctioning off the right to make the offer. These
treatments induced more selfish behavior. To deal with the
reputation issue, Hoffman, et al., invented some very clever
procedures that ensured students that their choices were anonymous,
both from the other students and from the researcher. 73 Together,
these procedures induced much more self-regarding behavior.74
In short, the implicit context in which the subjects found
themselves mattered.75 In spite of experimenters’ initial attempts to
Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature, 108 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 396 (2014).
73
This was only used in the dictator game.
74
By “self-regarding” we mean only that the offerors chose offers that were
much closer to the prediction for a single-shot game—$1. It is not synonymous
with “selfish,” although it could be that behaviorally the two concepts would look
much the same. Because the resulting offers were closer to $1, but not equal to
$1, it is quite possible that the offeror was responding, in part, to his perception
of the responder’s utility, as well as his own.
75
Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, Social Distance and
Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 653, 654
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put the subjects into a single-shot game, the students saw themselves
as embedded in a different, longer run game where reputation
mattered. And subjects needed to feel entitled to the right to make
the ultimatum offer. After Hoffman, McCabe and Smith addressed
these issues, subjects became much more self-regarding, and
fairness concerns faded (but not quite entirely) into the background.
There is also strong evidence that a very large increase in stakes
induces more self-regarding behavior.76 When Andersen, et al.,
increased the stakes to equal the pay for about 1600 hours of work,
the offers (as a percentage of the total amount at stake) went down,
and the acceptance rate went up.77 Smaller increases in stakes,
however, do not produce the corresponding increase in selfregarding behavior.78
There is every reason to believe that litigants in patent suits will
behave even more selfishly than did the subjects in Hoffman, et
al.’s, experiments. First, the plaintiffs obtained the patents by
purchasing them or by inventing something and getting the patent
from the Patent Office. Purchasing the patent corresponds to
purchasing the right to make the ultimatum offer, and getting a
(1996). (“We explore in detail the large observed discrepancy between these two
very disparate versions [fairness and reciprocity] of the dictator game. Our
working hypothesis is that the difference is due to the concept of social distance
or sense of coupling between the dictator and his or her counterpart, or others who
know the dictator’s decision. We systematically vary this distance by changing
elements of the language and procedures that a priori bear on the degree of the
dictator’s anonymity, and social isolation, in each of these two polar treatments.
The significance of social isolation is in the removal of all suggestion of the quid
pro quo of reciprocity. We believe that this experimental exercise is fundamental
to understanding the received evidence for other-regarding behavior that is
frequently manifest in bargaining game experiments, but in which strategic
reciprocity and utilitarian elements are confounded in interpreting observed
outcomes.”).
76
Steffen Andersen et al., Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games, 101 AM. ECON.
REV. 3427, 3428 (2011).
77
Andersen, et. al., supra note 76; see also Christopher Bechler, Leonard Green
& Joel Myerson, Proportion Offered in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games
Decreases with Amount and Social Distance, 115 BEHAV. PROCESSES 149, 153
(2015).
78
Andersen, et. al., supra note 76, at 3432, fig.2.
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patent from the Patent Office corresponds to the contest in Hoffman,
et. al.’s, work. The plaintiffs in patent lawsuits should feel entitled
to their rights. The reputation concerns that made student subjects
concerned about appearing too greedy should work the opposite way
with litigants. A reputation for being tough and unwilling to share
should produce higher settlement amounts in the future.
In summary, there is no reason to refrain from using the theory
to analyze patent suits and settlements. In fact, the Report cited some
of the economics literature that created the theory for litigation.
2. Example 2—symmetric information and negative expected value
Is it possible that a plaintiff can extract a positive settlement
amount even if both plaintiff and defendant know that the plaintiff
will lose money if he pushes the case all the way through verdict?
The answer is maybe. First, we will go through an example designed
to show negative expected value suits might succeed, and then we
will consider the response by Schwartz and Wickelgren.79 Even if
the NEV suit is successful, the settlement amount might be large, or
it might be small depending on how much bargaining power the
defendant has. Once again, the size of the settlement does not reveal
whether the underlying suit is PEV or NEV.
To see how this works, consider a slight modification of the
examples above.80 In the modified version the plaintiff has a cause
of action that will produce a verdict of $500,000 with certainty. But
in this version, there are three stages of litigation, each with
attendant costs for that stage. We will call the three stages S1, S2,
and S3. You may think of them respectively as pleading, discovery,
and trial if you like. Each of the three stages has costs associated

79

Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Advantage Defendant: Why
Sinking Litigation Costs Makes Negative-Expected-Value Defenses but Not
Negative-Expected-Value Suits Credible, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (2009).
80
The following examples are based on Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory
Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1996) (introducing the idea of stages of litigation into the formal literature). The
stages of litigation allows a NEV plaintiff to (sometimes) gain a positive
settlement. Bebchuk introduced the idea with a two-stage example, followed by a
formal model. See also Spier, supra note 52, at 271-72.
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with it, Cp for the plaintiff and Cd for the defendant. For this version
assume that the costs are as listed in the following table:
Table 1. Cost of Suit
S1
(pleading)

S2
(discovery)

S3
(trial)

Cp
(plaintiff’s
cost)

$75,000

$75,000

$400,000

Cd
(defendant’s
cost)

$100,000

$100,000

$400,000

Bargaining before S3: If the suit gets to the point right before S3,
we know how to figure out what the settlement will be. Note that at
this stage the suit has become PEV. The plaintiff rationally ignores
the expenditures from the pleading and discovery stages. Thus, the
plaintiff will definitely push forward with the trial if no settlement
is reached. At the end of the trial the plaintiff will be $100,000 better
off ($500,000 verdict less $400,000 in trial expenses.) The
defendant, on the other hand, will be $900,000 worse off ($500,000
verdict plus $400,000 in trial expenses). If the defendant has the
right to make the final offer, he will offer $100,000 to settle.81 On
the other hand, if the plaintiff has the right to make the final
settlement offer, he will offer $900,000. Now, assume that the
parties agree that defendant will have the right to make the final
offer with probability 1/2, and the plaintiff will make the final offer
with probability 1/2. Then the settlement amount will be
(1/2)($100,000) + (1/2)($900,000) = $50,000 + $450,000 =
$500,000.
81

Technically, $100,001. But to make the arithmetic easier we will assume that
the parties accept offers when they are indifferent.
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Bargaining before S2: If the suit gets past S1 the parties will be
faced with the following situation. They both know that if they go
through discovery (S2), they will be facing trial (S3). They both
know that if they get that far they will settle for $500,000. This is
more than the $75,000 that the plaintiff must spend to go through
discovery. Thus, plaintiff will push ahead and go through discovery
(S2) if there is no settlement. How much is the settlement amount at
S2? If the parties were to fail to settle before S2 the plaintiff would
get $500,000 - $75,000 = $425,000. The defendant would lose
$500,000 + $100,000 = $600,000. If defendant has the right to make
the final offer then he will offer $425,000. On the other hand, if
plaintiff has the right to make the final offer, he will demand
$600,000.
Assume that they agree that at this stage (and at S1) defendant
will have the right to make the final offer with probability 1/2, and
the plaintiff will make the final offer with probability 1/2. Then the
settlement amount just prior to S2 will be (1/2)($425,000) +
(1/2)($600,000) = $212,500 + $300,000 = $512,500.
Bargaining before S1: The parties know that if they fail to settle
at S1 that they will settle for $512,500 before S2. By going through
S1, they will each incur litigation costs. The plaintiff will get, after
S1: $512,500 - $75,000 = $437,500. The defendant will lose, after
S1: $512,500 + $100,000 = $612,500. If defendant gets to make the
final offer prior to S1 he will offer $437,500; while if the plaintiff
gets to make the final offer he will demand $612,500. Since we
continue to assume that they agree that there is a 1/2 probability of
each making the final offer, they will settle for (1/2)($437,500) +
(1/2)($612,500) = $218,750 + $306,250 = $525,000.
Thus, it is possible for a NEV suit—a “nuisance suit” in the
FTC’s terminology—to settle for quite a bit of money. This is the
contra-negative of the FTC’s claim. A high settlement amount does
not imply a PEV suit.
What would have happened if we had varied the bargaining
power? Let’s assume that the defendant has all of the bargaining
power. We will show that there will be no settlement, and the
plaintiff will not pursue the suit. Using the cost and value figures
from above, before S3 the parties would settle for (1)($100,000) +
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(0)($900,000) = $100,000. Before S2 the parties would settle for
$25,000 (which is the $100,000 that the parties would settle for
before S3, less the $75,000 of plaintiff’s litigation costs in S2). But
negotiations stall here. Before S1 the plaintiff must spend $75,000
in litigation costs to get a $25,000 settlement prior to S2. This is
common knowledge. The defendant will, hence, refuse to offer
anything and the suit will die at the beginning. The plaintiff will not
proceed because it would be economically irrational.
In a response to Bebchuk’s argument, Warren Schwartz and
Abraham Wickelgren argue that a more realistic bargaining model
than the one used above will render NEV suits extremely unlikely.82
In particular, Schwartz and Wickelgren argue that the value of the
plaintiff’s “outside option”—going to trial— should limit the
amount the plaintiff can expect just prior to S3. In any reasonable
description of the bargaining between the plaintiff and defendant,
Schwartz and Wickelgren claim that the defendant should always
have the option (in our example) to offer $100,000 (or, possibly,
$100,001). Once the defendant has done so, plaintiff will not
rationally proceed to litigation.83 But once the parties know that the
plaintiff will not get more than $100,000 prior to S3, there will be no
credible threat to proceed to trial prior to period S1, and the suit will
never be filed. Thus, argue Schwartz and Wickelgren, NEV suits are
unlikely to be filed.84 This, of course, impeaches the FTC’s claim. If
NEV suits are unlikely to be filed in the first place, low settlement
amounts are very unlikely to imply that the underlying suit was NEV
when filed.
Let’s run through a final example (putting the Schwartz and
Wickelgren critique to one side), otherwise identical to the one with
equal bargaining power, but where the parties agree that there is a .9
82

Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelegren, Advantage Defendant: Why
Sinking Litigation Costs Makes Negative-Expected-Value Defenses but Not
Negative-Expected Value Suits Credible, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (2009).
82
Schwartz & Wickelgren, supra note 79.
83
See id. at 241.
84
Schwartz and Wickelgren argue that it is possible, in some circumstances, for
defendants, using multiple-stage affirmative defenses, to convert PEV suits into
NEV suits. By doing so, even some PEV suits may be deterred. Even if not
deterred, the settlement amounts may be lowered. Id. at 243-45.
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probability that the defendant will give the final offer, and a .1
probability that the plaintiff will give the final offer. Then, just prior
to S3, the parties will settle for (.9)($100,000) + (.1)($900,000) =
$90,000 + $90,000 = $180,000; just prior to S2, the plaintiff would
demand $180,000 + $100,000 = $280,000, and defendant would
offer only $180,000 - $75,000 = $105,000. Hence, the parties would
settle for (.9)($105,000) + (.1)($280,000) = $94,500 + $28,000 =
$122,500. Working backwards, just prior to S1, the plaintiff’s suit is
now credible. By spending $75,000 to get past S1 (pleading stage)
the plaintiff could settle for $122,500. Therefore, prior to S1, the
plaintiff would demand $122,500 + $100,000 = $222,500, while the
defendant would offer only $122,500 - $75,000 = $47,500. The
settlement before S1 is (.9)($47,500) + (.1)($222,500) = $42,750 +
$22,250 = $65,000. This is well below the $300,000 cutoff used by
the FTC.
What does this example show? Sometimes, but not always,
plaintiffs can get positive settlements in NEV suits. The plaintiff
needs enough bargaining power to extract enough of defendant’s
saved costs to get a settlement in a NEV suit. When the plaintiff has
significant bargaining power the settlement amount can be
substantial. On the other hand, when plaintiff has just enough
bargaining power (e.g., .1) to make a NEV suit viable, the settlement
amount will be small (e.g., $65,000). Thus, small settlement
amounts are, for NEV suits, neither necessary nor sufficient. To
remind the reader, this example assumed that the plaintiff was
certain to win if he went all the way through trial. The underlying
suit is as meritorious as can be. Further, if the Schwartz and
Wickelgren argument is correct, NEV suits will not be filed in the
first place. Neither the size of settlement, nor whether the plaintiff
chooses to pursue the case, at all, is probative of the merits of the
underlying suit.
There are a number of other scenarios in which NEV suits might
succeed in getting a positive settlement.85 For example, the parties
85

See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative-ExpectedValue Suits (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 656, 2009).
Also, see Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519
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might be asymmetrically informed,86 and the uninformed party
might extend a settlement offer to a plaintiff with a NEV suit.87
Alternatively, the defendant might have to spend significant money
before the plaintiff does, inducing the plaintiff to file suit and the
defendant to settle, regardless of merits.88 Or, litigation costs might
be divisible (as in the examples above) and the plaintiff might learn
something part way through the litigation.89 Or, the plaintiff and his
attorney may structure their arrangements, possibly by using a
retainer, so as to credibly convert a negative expected value suit into
a positive expected value suit.90 But none of these scenarios suggests
that a small settlement amount allows one to deduce either that the
suit is NEV or that the underlying suit is meritless. Thus, the FTC’s
claim fails in many different settings.
3. Example 3—Asymmetric Information
Screening model—one sided asymmetric information: When
only one of the parties is fully informed the game changes, but not
necessarily in a way that makes the Report become any more

(1997), for an excellent earlier review, focusing on meritless negative expected
value suits.
86
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437, 440–43 (1988); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the
Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990).
87
Section 3.a., which immediately follows this discussion, analyzes the
situation where the uninformed party extends the settlement offer.
88
David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985); David Rosenberg &
Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The Option to Have
the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 26, 42–51 (2006).
89
Bone, supra note 54; Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected
Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006).
90
See Zhiqi Chen, Nuisance Suits and Contingent Attorney Fees, 2 REV. L. &
ECON. 363, 366 (2006) (discussing effect of contingency fees); Hubbard, supra
note 53; Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Taking a Financial Position in Your
Opponent in Litigation, AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing shorting
a defendant’s firm); David C. Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling the
Stonewall: Retaining Lawyers to Bolster Credibility, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 65,
69–71 (1996) (discussing a non-refundable retainer).
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appealing.91 To understand why this is so, we will walk through an
example where the plaintiff knows everything about his case, but the
defendant does not know whether the plaintiff has a PEV suit or a
NEV suit.92 The uninformed defendant makes the offer to settle.
If the suit is PEV, we will use the following assumptions: The
plaintiff and defendant agree that if the case were taken all the way
through trial the plaintiff would certainly prevail, and would be
awarded $500,000. They also both agree that if the suit is PEV it
will cost the plaintiff $100,000 to push the case all the way to
verdict. It will cost defendant $400,000. On the other hand, if the
suit is NEV, both plaintiff and defendant agree that plaintiff’s costs
are higher than $500,000, so a rational NEV plaintiff will not push
the case to trial. The parties also agree that the defendant (the
uninformed party) will make the final offer.
What is the lowest offer the defendant can make that will be
accepted? If the case is PEV and goes to trial the defendant will lose
the $500,000 damages, plus the $400,000 in costs. This sums to
$900,000. The plaintiff, on the other hand, will gain, net of costs,
only $400,000. If the suit is NEV the plaintiff will never take it to
trial. Further, the defendant can expect every NEV plaintiff will
accept any positive offer to settle.
Recall that the defendant is uncertain about which type of suit
has been brought against him. But he has an idea of the underlying
distribution of potential suits, either PEV or NEV. Let’s call the
proportion of PEV suits in the underlying distribution of potential
suits r.
If r is very close to one, the defendant will say to himself “I only
want to settle PEV suits. In order to settle I have to offer $400,000.
If I offer less than that almost no case will settle. But if I offer
$400,000 to every plaintiff, I will be paying off some NEV
plaintiffs. However, since there are so few of them, this is my best
91

See Bone, supra note 54, at 534, for a superb explanation of these models in
the case of meritless suits. See generally Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial
Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987).
92
This model, in which the uninformed party makes the offer to settle, is often
termed a screening model. We will review the other sort, where the informed party
makes the offer to settle, termed a signaling model, after the screening model.
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strategy.” In this setting, some NEV plaintiffs get settlements, but
they get the same high settlement amount that the PEV plaintiffs get.
Thus, we cannot use, in this case, settlement amount to deduce
whether the suit was NEV or PEV.
On the other hand, if r is so very close to zero that almost the
entire universe of potential plaintiffs is NEV, the defendant may say
to himself “I don’t want to give money to the NEV plaintiffs, and
they are almost all of the cases. So, I will offer nothing, and take my
lumps with the few PEV plaintiffs who take me to trial.”93
When r is in between zero and one, but close to neither, it is
much more likely that the defendant will employ a mixed strategy,
offering a settlement with probability s, and no settlement with
probability 1-s. In response, all PEV plaintiffs will file suit, and
NEV plaintiffs will file suit with probability f, and not file with
probability 1-f.94 In this setting, 1-r of the potential plaintiffs are
NEV, and since they file suit with probability f, the frequency of
NEV suits among all filings is:
1−𝑟 𝑓
(𝑟 + 1 − 𝑟 𝑓)
Since the defendant offers s of the plaintiff’s settlements, s times
the fraction above is the portion of NEV suits that settle. But the
important thing to note for our purposes is that if they settle, the NEV
suits settle for the same $400,000 amount that the PEV suits settle
for. Once again, we cannot use settlement amount to deduce the
nature of the suit, contrary to the Report’s claims.
Signaling model–one sided asymmetric information: If the
informed party makes the offer to settle, things may change. In a
very elegant paper by Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde,
the authors demonstrate that if the informed party (say, plaintiff)
93

Technically, such a result cannot be an equilibrium. If the defendant offers
no settlement amounts, then there will be no NEV plaintiffs that will file suit. But
that means that all plaintiffs are PEV, and the defendant will know this. In
response, he will want to offer settlements of $400,000 to all plaintiffs. But that
will induce NEV plaintiffs to file suit. Instead, defendant must use a mixed
strategy, offering only a (small) portion of plaintiffs a settlement.
94
See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of
Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990) (explaining the result).
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makes the offer to settle, the high value plaintiffs will separate from
the low value plaintiffs in their offers.95 The defendants will still
reject some of the offers in equilibrium. Translating their result into
the topic of inquiry in this Critique of the Report is almost
impossible. We can say the Reinganum and Wilde result means that
suits that would be worth more (if there were perfect information)
will settle for more money if the informed plaintiffs make the offer
to settle. But we have not made the connection to NEV suits and
PEV suits. Within the terms of Reinganum and Wilde’s model, we
cannot. That is because Reinganum and Wilde expressly assume that
all plaintiffs have PEV suits.96
Fortunately, we do not have to guess what will happen if we put
NEV suits into this model. Farmer and Pecorino extended the
signaling model to include NEV suits.97 Their inquiry shows that in
equilibrium the NEV suits are separated from PEV suits, and only
PEV suits are filed.98 Because the NEV suits are not credible threats
to go to trial, and because they are separated out, they do not get
positive offers to settle. Anticipating the lack of an offer to settle,
the NEV plaintiffs do not file suit.
Farmer and Pecorino’s result further impeaches the Report’s
claim that a small settlement amount implies that the underlying suit
was NEV. Because in the Farmer and Pecorino analysis no NEV
suits are filed, no NEV suits will be settled. Thus, if one observes a
settlement, one can be sure the underlying suit is PEV. Thus, within
the signaling model paradigm, the Report’s claim fails.
Two-sided asymmetric information: What if both plaintiff and
defendant knew something about the case that the other did not? For
example, the defendant might know whether or not the suit is likely
to end in a finding of liability, while the plaintiff has only a rough
guess. On the other hand, the plaintiff might know the extent of
95

See Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the
Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986).
96
See id. at 559.
97
See Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Negative Expected Value Suits in a
Signaling Model, 74 S. ECON. J. 434 (2007).
98
They also included positive costs of filing a suit, which is needed to make the
model work. See id. It is a very reasonable assumption.
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damages (if there is a finding of liability), while the defendant is
quite uncertain.99 An example of such a situation is in the table
immediately below.
Table 2. 2-sided limited information
Only Plaintiff Knows

Only Defendant Knows

Damages = $500,000

Defendant .9 likely to be
liable

Damages = $300,000

Defendant .3 likely to be
liable

Only the plaintiff knows if damages are $500,000 or $300,000,
while only the defendant knows whether she is .9 likely to be liable
or .3 likely to be liable. In this setting we cannot figure out what the
settlement offer will be without making an assumption about who,
plaintiff or defendant, will be making the offer.
This is, undoubtedly, more complicated (and possibly more
realistic) than the other examples we have considered. In general,
the amount of information that is revealed in the final settlement
amount depends on which party makes the settlement offer. That is,
if the plaintiff makes the settlement offer, his private information
may be revealed in the settlement amount, but the private
information of the defendant who accepts the settlement will not.100
Similarly, if the defendant makes the settlement offer, the
defendant’s private information may be revealed in the settlement
99

See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Settlement Negotiations
with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information
Distribution, and Efficiency, 14 INT’l REV. L. & ECON. 283 (1994) (demonstrating
the structure); see also Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Daniel Klerman, Litigation and
Settlement under Correlated Two-Sided Incomplete Information (Working Paper,
2016) (extending the framework); Joel Sobel, An Analysis of Discovery Rules, 52
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 133 (1989).
100
See Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 99, at 283. In their model, as in the
one-sided information model, there are also pooling equilibria. Daughety and
Reinganum rule them out by using a refinement on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. See
id. at 289 n.7.
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amount, but the plaintiff’s private information will not. Thus, this
situation lies somewhere between the extremes of asymmetric
information with only one person uninformed, and either the
informed or uninformed party to the suit makes the offer.
The parties’ private information undoubtedly affects the
settlement value of the suit, with more valuable suits settling for
more money. But since only part of the private information—the
part known by the offeror—may work its way into the settlement
amount, this probably means that the potential dispersion in
settlement amounts is less in this example than it would be in the
one sided signaling model if all of the information were known to
the offering party.
However, making the connection to the Report’s claim is almost
impossible. First, Daughety and Reinganum assume that all suits are
PEV. Thus, within their model, there are no NEV suits to observe,
settling or going to trial. Second, to my knowledge, no one has
extended their two-sided model to include NEV suits, similar to
Farmer and Pecorino’s approach for the pure signaling model. If the
Farmer and Pecorino approach carries over into this two-sided
model, then there would be no NEV suits filed here either. But,
pending more research, the best we can say is that the approach
might carry over. However, we can say something stronger with
respect to the Report’s claims: there is nothing in the two-sided
signaling model that lends support to its claim that a low settlement
amount implies that the underlying suit is NEV.
4. Example 4—including default judgments
The best (and possibly the only) argument (to my knowledge)
that settlement amount allows one to deduce something about the
merits of the underlying case (but not about whether the underlying
case was NEV) comes from William Hubbard.101 Hubbard has a
model in which settlements include a greater proportion of lowmerits, high-stakes cases than high-merits, low-stakes cases.102 The
basic insight is that if the defendant can get out of the suit by
101

See William H.J. Hubbard, Sinking Costs to Force or Deter Settlement, 32
J. L. ECON. & ORGAN. 545 (2016).
102
Id. at 355.
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defaulting in the latter cases—essentially paying the “low-stake”
amount into court—then the remaining cases will be low-merits.103
Let’s cast this argument in terms of Example 1, but modify it so that
the expected recovery, $500,000, is the product of the probability of
plaintiff’s victory, multiplied by the size of damages if the plaintiff
is victorious. Let us consider two cases. One in which the probability
of victory is .2, and the damages (if plaintiff wins) are $2,500,000,
has expected value of $500,000. A second, in which the probability
of victory is 1, and damages are $500,000, also has expected value
of $500,000. A defendant in the second case could just default, pay
$500,000, and save the litigation costs. But defaulting in the first
case would cost the defendant $2,500,000, which is likely far more
than litigation costs plus the expected $500,000 in liability. Thus, in
the first case, the defendant will need a settlement at some amount
less than the $2,500,000 prayer. And, says Hubbard’s argument, the
only settlement we see has a probability of victory at .2 in the
underlying suit. Repeat this scenario over and over and we will get
a pool of settlements in cases with low probability of victory, and a
pool of defaults with high probability of plaintiff victory.
Hubbard’s argument is smart,104 but it doesn’t seem to apply to
the patent litigation setting. First, if it were to apply to patent
litigation, the FTC should have found a large pool of default
judgments in the data it acquired. However, the FTC found no such
thing.105 Second, there is a very good reason that a defendant does
not want to default. Unless the patent has already expired at the time
of the suit—an unlikely occurrence—the (alleged) infringement will
103

Id.
Such a result requires that the true amount at stake is not only observable,
but verifiable by a court virtually at the time of filing the suit. If the stakes are not
verifiable, the low-stake plaintiffs can pretend to be high-stake plaintiffs early in
the litigation process, preventing defendants from exercising a cheap default. See
id. at 561.
105
FTC, supra note 2, at 68. The FTC states in its Report’s note 214 that
“Independent review of the dockets in these lawsuits also identified two instances
of a Responding PAE obtaining a default judgment.” Id. at 69 n.214. This was out
of “3,895 cases that were initiated in U.S. district court by 256 unique plaintiffs
against 1,956 unique defendants between January1, 2009 and September 15,
2014.” Id. at 68.
104
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be ongoing. If the defendant defaults he only pays for past
infringement, not future infringement. In addition, if the defendant
were to default and then continue to infringe, he would be sued
again. But in the subsequent suit the plaintiff would allege bad faith,
intentional infringement.106 After all, the plaintiff would claim, the
first suit clearly put the defendant on notice of the infringement
allegations, and the failure to defend constituted a type of admission.
Thus, the plaintiff would claim, the second suit should trigger
enhanced damages, as well as the award of attorney’s fees.107 To
avoid this outcome the defendant must settle (or litigate to victory)
the first suit. As part of the settlement the defendant will get a license
to use the patents at issue.
5. Example 5—Many Defendants
Let us assume that a plaintiff owns a patent, infringed (with
certainty) by all manufacturers in the industry. In addition, we
assume that damages are equal to $50,000 for each percent of the
total market the manufacturer has, and that the market (and
damages) are arranged as in the following table:
Table 3. Many defendants in market
Manufact
urer

%
of
Mark
et

1

1
0

2

1

3

107

$480,00

s

$500,00
0

$400,0
00

$480,00
0

Damage

$400,0
00

0
1

0

D’s
Litigation
Cost

$480,00
0

0

106

P’s
Litigation
Cost

$500,00
0

$400,0
00

$500,00
0

See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1923 (2016).
See, e.g., Highmark v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S.Ct. 1744 (2014).
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1
0

5

$480,00
0

6

$480,00
0

$400,0

$1,000,
000

$500,00
0

00

5
0

$400,0
00

1
0
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$500,00
0

$400,0
00

$2,500,
000

In addition, assume that manufacturer 6, with better lawyers and
greater wealth, can impose greater discovery costs on the plaintiff.
Thus, for all of the manufacturers 1 through 5, litigation costs look
like they did in Example 1. Plaintiff and all defendants agree that to
push the case all the way to verdict will cost the plaintiff $480,000
and each defendant $400,000. But in the case of defendant 6, it will
cost plaintiff $1,000,000 and defendant $400,000. Further, assume
that plaintiff, at the start of this example, is cash-constrained. He is
not able to spend anywhere close to $1,000,000 in litigation costs.108
Further, as in Example 1, neither party is certain which of them has
the resolve to commit to giving the final offer. The parties agree,
however, that the defendant will make the final offer with
probability p, and the plaintiff will make the final offer with
probability with (1-p), where 0≤p≤1. In this case, the parties will
settle for about p($20,000) + (1-p)($900,000). For the purposes of
this example we will assume that p = .8.109 Thus, the plaintiff will
sue the first five defendants and settle with each for $196,000. This
produces a total of almost a million dollars.
However, for manufacturer 6, things change. Because plaintiff
has collected approximately $1,000,000 in settlements from the first
five manufacturers, it can credibly threaten to take the case all the
way to judgment. If plaintiff takes the case to judgment it will get
$2,500,000 - $1,000,000 = $1,500,000. Defendant will lose
$2,900,000. Thus, the plaintiff and defendant will settle for
108

Also assume the secondary litigation finance market cannot provide the
needed litigation expenses.
109
In so doing we are incorporating some of the strength of Schwartz and
Wickelgren’s critique of settlement bargaining, see Schwartz & Wickelgren,
supra note 79, as most of the bargaining power goes to defendant.
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(.8)($1,500,000) + (.2)($2,900,000) = $1,200,000 + $580,000 =
$1,780,000. The massive change in settlement amount occurs even
though the underlying lawsuit is identical, except for damages, and
the size of the defendant’s litigation costs do not change. And it
happens only because the first five suits, suits which the FTC would
incorrectly label as “nuisance” (or NEV), settle first.
Because this sort of market structure is mathematically likely to
occur (because you can’t have several incumbents in an industry
with 50% market share, but you can have several with 10% market
share) it is likely that a scholar, including the FTC, will observe
many settlements for small amounts of money, and only one for a
larger amount of money. This does not mean that patent litigation is
“broken” in any reasonable sense of the word.
6. Example 6—Self Serving Bias
There is literature, coming more from psychology and law than
from economics, focused on why lawsuits fail to settle. This
literature posits that often plaintiff’s expectations of how much they
will win at trial are greater than defendant’s expectations of loss at
trial. If the difference is larger than the expected trial costs, then the
suit cannot settle; the maximum that the defendant will offer is less
than the plaintiff’s minimum willingness to accept. This difference
in beliefs arises because of self-serving heuristics and biases.110 We
can deduce quickly the effect of self-serving bias on the rate of
settlement—the rate decreases. However, the effect of this sort of
self-serving bias on the settlement amount, when settlements occur,
is ambiguous: although self-serving biases can often be detrimental
in negotiation, that may not always be the case. Farmer and Pecorino
show that a self-serving bias apparent to the other side can benefit
the biased litigant by forcing the other party to make a more
favorable offer.111

110

See Linda Babcock & Joshua Furgeson, Bounded Rationality in the
Settlement Process: Empirical Evidence on the Causes of Settlement Failure in
Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS Ch. 14
(Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2014).
111
See Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Pretrial Bargaining with Self-Serving
Bias and Asymmetric Information, 48 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 163, 176 (2002).
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Let’s depict the settlement range from a modified version of
Example 1, above. (Thus, we are working in the symmetric
information setting.) In this variation of Example 1, with no selfserving bias, the plaintiff and defendant agree that if the case were
taken all the way through trial the plaintiff would certainly prevail,
and would be awarded $500,000. They also both agree that to push
the case all the way to verdict will cost the plaintiff $380,000 and
will cost defendant $300,000. Under these assumptions, if the
plaintiff will make the final offer (i.e. has all bargaining power) the
suit will settle for $800,000; if defendant will make the final offer
(i.e. has all the bargaining power) it will settle for only $120,000.112
What happens when there are self-serving biases? Assume that
the Plaintiff thinks that he is certain to win $600,000 if the case goes
to trial, but the defendant believes that he will lose only $400,000 if
the case goes to trial. We can see the impact of self-serving bias in
the parties’ expectations. Under these assumptions, the defendant
will be willing to pay no more than $700,000 to settle the suit, and
plaintiff will accept no less than $220,000 to settle the suit.

Figure 2
112

We are abstracting away from the Schwartz and Wickelgren, supra note 79,
critique of settlement bargaining.
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Thus, we can see that self-serving biases shrink the bargaining
range. When settlement does occur in the presence of self-serving
biases, it will be restricted to a smaller range of values. In the limit,
it will be harder and harder to distinguish situations where the
plaintiff has the bargaining power from the situations where the
defendant does. But none of this has obvious implications for NEV
suits.
How do self-serving biases play out in the context of asymmetric
information models? It is not easy to say. One would need to mash
together self-serving bias with each of the previous models to
understand the analytics. There are a few general papers that are in
the field.113 None of them produces the results we would need to
make the connection between the models and NEV and PEV suits.
And all of these papers are complex enough that intuition cannot
make the connection. Until someone works out this complex
relationship, we must refrain from using any of these papers in this
critique. Thus, for the moment, we have to conclude that that the
self-serving bias literature gives us no purchase on the question of
whether a low settlement amount implies that the underlying suit
was NEV. This implies, of course, that this literature gives no
support to the Report’s claim that a low settlement amount implies
that the underlying suit was NEV.
C. Summary on Litigation
The Report claimed that if a suit were to settle for a small amount
of money then one could conclude that the suit was NEV. By
113

See Andrea Gallice, Self-Serving Biased Reference Points (Collegio Carlo
Alberto, Working Paper, 2011), www.carloalberto.org/working_papers (showing
that with both self-serving bias and reference point-based utility functions, fewer
lawsuits will settle); Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Pretrial Bargaining with SelfServing Bias and Asymmetric Information, 48 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 163
(2002); Farmer & Pecorino, supra note 111; Eric Langlais, Cognitive Dissonance,
Risk Aversion and the Pretrial Negotiation Impasse (Munich Personal RePEc
Archive, Working Paper, 2008) (employing a two-stage model in which parties
are aware of their own biases); Muhamet Yildiz, Bargaining with Optimism, 3.1
ANN. REV. ECON. 451 (2011) (exploring, among other things, how optimism
about future bargaining power leads litigants to wait until the last minute to settle).
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routinely calling NEV suits “nuisance” suits, the FTC indicated that
the suits were probably meritless, and consequently bad. All of this
is completely wrong for the following reasons:
1. The category of NEV suits includes both meritless suits and
meritorious suits. Whereas the former may be worthy of
disapprobation, the latter have value, particularly in contexts like
patent, where enforcing rights is supposed to guide conduct and
produce spillover benefits.
2. The Report incorrectly claims that a low settlement amount
implies that the underlying suit was NEV. This claim is almost
certainly wrong. In the symmetric information models, low
settlement amount is completely consistent with both PEV suits and
NEV suits. Some of the other explanations of settlement that we
explored allowed us to say something about the underlying suit. The
signaling models (with either one-sided or two-sided information)
provided a hint that a low settlement amount revealed the expected
value of the lawsuit that was being settled. A low settlement amount
may reveal low expected value. But these models provided
absolutely no link to the Report’s claims about NEV suits.
Hubbard’s model, including default judgments, allowed us to
conclude that settled cases probably had lower probability of
success on the merits. But it neither seemed to apply to PAE suits,
nor did it have anything to say about NEV suits. None of the other
models we explored provided any support for the FTC’s position,
either. When you put all of this together, we must reject the FTC’s
claim that a low settlement amount implies that the suit was NEV.
3. Putting the first two points together, the FTC has failed to
establish any link between low settlement amounts and “bad”
lawsuits.
II. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
For the purposes of discussion, we will divide policy
recommendations into two groups: those that were not in the FTC’s
Report, and those that were. We will discuss the policy
recommendations that were in the Report first.
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The FTC made four policy recommendations, ostensibly related
(somehow) to the empirical findings.114 So, one might think, the four
policy recommendations must fail, just as the empirical assertion
about NEV suits failed. However, the linkage between the FTC’s
empirical assertions and their policy recommendations was far from
clear in the Report. Thus, the policy recommendations might have
appeal, regardless of the failure of the FTC’s empirical assertions.
But one would need to do more work, unconnected to the highly
flawed analysis in the Report, to figure out which of the FTC’s
policy recommendations has appeal. To see why this is true, we will
pick out the first of the FTC’s recommendations.
Consider the first policy recommendation–to “[d]evelop rules
and case management practices to address discovery burden and
cost asymmetries in PAE litigation.”115 The FTC noted that Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to meet and
work on producing a plan for discovery. The FTC suggested that
Rule 26 should be amended, inter alia, to require early disclosure of
asserted claims and infringement and invalidity contentions, as well
as to limit discovery before preliminary motions together with
provisions to ensure that such motions are decided quickly. The
idea, in short, is to reduce defendants’ costs, particularly early in the
litigation.
Is this a good idea? Our conclusion from the previous section
was that one could not tell from the Report’s discussion of NEV and
PEV suits whether this was a good idea. As an intuitive matter,
however, the FTC’s suggestion might make sense. After all,
reducing costs is good. Let’s look at one of the NEV examples
discussed above to see that this is less clear cut than one might think.
In particular, let’s rewrite Table 1 above with greatly reduced costs
for defendant (but not plaintiff). The reduced costs represent the
effect of the suggested reform.

114

See FTC, supra note 2, at 8–13.
See FTC, supra note 2, at 9. “One step toward achieving this goal would be
to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which addresses discovery in civil
actions, in a way that helps balance these relative burdens.” Id. at 10.
115
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Table 4. Cost of Suit
S1
(pleading)
Cp
(plaintiff’s
cost)
Cd
(defendant’s
cost)

S2
(discovery)

119

S3
(trial)

$75,000

$75,000

$400,000

$25,000

$25,000

$200,000

Recall that in this example the plaintiff is sure to win $500,000
if the case goes to trial.116 Also, there is a 1/2 chance that defendant
will make the last settlement offer at each stage, and a ½ chance that
plaintiff will do so. In the original example, with high costs, the
plaintiff and defendant would settle for $525,000. This represents a
slight over-deterrence of the defendant’s infringement, at least when
compared to the $500,000 expected verdict if the case were to go to
trial.
What will happen with lower costs? If we work through the
arithmetic we find that the parties still settle, but for $350,000. Is
that better than settling for $525,000? It is certainly better for the
defendant. But is this better for society? The $350,000 settlement
amount represents a significant under-deterrence of the defendant,
rather than the slight over-deterrence of $525,000. It is difficult to
know whether this is better for society or not. That, in fact, is our
major point.
It is very difficult, without doing significantly more work, to
know if the specific four proposals in the Report are good ideas or
not. One must, for each reform, carefully trace through its expected
effects on filing suits, settlement amounts, settlement rates, and
returns to inventing and patenting. The FTC did not do this work,
and neither will we in this critique. All we can say is that the case
for these reforms has yet to be made.
116

Again, we are abstracting from Schwartz and Wickelgren’s critique. See
Schwartz & Wickelgren, supra note 79.
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As for policy recommendations that are not in the Report, our
recommendation is much clearer. Do not rely on the FTC’s analysis
for creating new policy recommendations. For example, one might
be tempted, given the analysis in the Report, to ban patent suits that
are likely to settle for less than $300,000, and involve PAEs. Most
of these are, according to the FTC, “nuisance” suits, and, hence,
bad.117 However, as we have shown, many of these suits may be
meritorious, and have value.118 Hence, getting rid of all such suits
will likely have great costs. Instead, a reformer should set about to
find and remove meritless suits. Unfortunately, nothing in the
Report likely helps a reformer to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Report includes a path breaking collection of data. Because
of the FTC’s ability to force businesses and individuals to provide
information, a power that no ordinary researcher possesses, the FTC
has amassed a data set that can potentially be of great value. For
example, the Report’s description of litigation PAEs and portfolio
PAEs structure and behavior is, although not entirely new, very
instructive. Unfortunately, the FTC made a pair of analytical errors
that precludes using its work to directly support policy prescriptions.
Consequently, in terms of providing normative guidance, the Report
is a failure.
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To be clear, this is not the FTC’s recommendation. But it could be a
recommendation of someone using the FTC’s Report, without the benefit of this
article.
118
Bebchuk and Klement correctly sum up the ambiguous normative status of
negative expected value suits: “With respect to NEV suits that are meritorious
(and are NEV simply because the required litigation costs would be large relative
to the amount at stake), an NEV plaintiff’s ability to extract a settlement offer
might well be socially beneficial. In contrast, with respect to NEV suits that are
frivolous, an NEV plaintiff’s ability to extract a settlement offer might well have
undesirable consequences.” Lucian Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative
Expected-Value Suits 8 (Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 656, 2009).

